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Throughout his life Justice Douglas was a controversial figure. Al-
though history will certainly place him among the greatest of our
Justices, he did not, during his lifetime, appeal to everybody. Much of
the legal academic elite indicted him for failing to follow "neutral
principles," official bureaucracies were inclined to feel he ignored
their efforts to maintain effective government, and large segments of
the establishment looked upon him with disfavor if not alarm. On
the other hand, Justice Douglas had a remarkably broad constituency.
It extended far beyond the legal profession, to ordinary citizens, to
the molders of opinion, to environmentalists, to peoples of foreign
lands. My concern here, however, is with his impact upon lawyers.
Justice Douglas was a source of inspiration and hope for many
members of the legal profession. But his presence on the Supreme
Court was of special importance to liberal, progressive, and radical
lawyers, to young idealistic law students and practitioners, to- older
lawyers with old-fashioned values, to that part of the legal academic
world that was attempting to push beyond legal realism, and in gen-
eral to all lawyers fighting for causes and seeking to change the world.
Whatever the crisis of the time-McCarthyism, civil rights, the Vietnam
War, Watergate-these lawyers could find understanding and support in
Justice Douglas. More than that, they often found new ideas, for Justice
Douglas was usually ahead of his constituency.
Justice Douglas's influence lay not only in his extraordinary ability,
though a lesser person taking his course might not have survived; nor
only in his courage, though that was an integral part; nor only in his
length of service on the Supreme Court, though that heightened his
impact. It also lay in a series of themes that he consistently sounded
throughout his life and work. Those themes, which in combination
made Douglas a unique Justice, could be illustrated profusely from
his legal opinions and other writings. They can only be sketched in
bare outline here.
At the core of Justice Douglas's world is his view of the role of the
individual in American life. From Justice Brandeis, whom Justice
Douglas succeeded on the bench and who greatly influenced him, he
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took the concept of the right of the individual to self-realization. He
felt strongly not only that the Bill of Rights was intended as "a safe-
guard of conscience and human dignity,"' but that it was meant to
assure "the autonomous control over the development and expression
of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality." 2 For Justice Douglas
this right of self-realization was not passive or self-indulgent, but active
and expanding, involving a willingness to struggle. "The great values
of freedom are in the opportunities afforded man to press to new
horizons, to pit his strength against the forces of nature, to match skills
with [not against] his fellow man."3 Above all he rejected the notion
of the individual as conformist, compliant, or submissive to authority.
Rather he urged Americans to be self-reliant, innovative, dissident, to
have a "real appetite for independence." 4 He summed it up by saying,
"The strength of our system is in the dignity, the resourcefulness, and
the independence of our people."3
The call was for persons with an active social conscience, not for
those willing to rest comfortably on the status quo. The lawyers who
struggled for causes, and worked with people likewise struggling, shared
these feelings and found encouragement in them.
Complementary to Justice Douglas's view of the individual was a
life-enhancing view of American society. He did not visualize America
as static, hide-bound, run by "faceless, nameless bureaucrats," 6 in-
habited by people whose main interest was to get along. Rather, he
conceived it as being alive, vibrant, and somewhat contentious. Thus,
one function of free speech was "to invite dispute. It may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger."7 America ought to be active, innovative, and changing. More-
over, he did not look at America as consisting only of its people, living
in isolation, but rather as including all of nature. Hence its trees, its
mountains, its lakes, and its rivers should be entitled to representation
in the decisionmaking process.8
Moreover, and perhaps most important of all, Justice Douglas
thought of America as representing something special in the history
1. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445 (1956). All citations to cases and books,
unless otherwise noted, are to the writings of Justice Douglas.
2. Roe v. WVade, 410 U.S. 113, 211 (1973).
3. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442,472 (1954).
4. OF MEN AND MouNTAiNs 329 (1950).
5. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952).
6. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 621 (1973).
7. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
8. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-43 (1972).
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of civilization. To him, America was an ideology, an "-ism." He
recognized that its shape and meaning were not yet finished; the job
had to be completed. But he believed in progress. Despite adverse
trends and specific setbacks, he was optimistic that the vision could
be realized. Here again the appeal of Justice Douglas was not to those
forces in society that were exploiting America. But it did summon to
action those who shared his faith in progress.
A third theme in the work of Justice Douglas was his resolute grasp
of social reality, despite the legal trappings in which the issues were
presented. This quality he also took from Justice Brandeis and from
the Brandeis Brief. Justice Douglas was skeptical of legal formulations
and impatient with those who relied upon them without examining
whether they were still rooted in the facts. "Formulas of respect for
constitutional safeguards," he said, "cannot prevail over the facts of
life which contradict them. They may not become a cloak for in-
quisitorial practices and make an empty form of the due process of law
for which free men fought and died to obtain."9
Justice Douglas's close touch with social reality was evident in
numerous opinions. In reviewing the prosecution of the Communist
Party leaders for their advocating overthrow of the government by
force and violence, he applied the "clear and present danger" test-a
formula he later rejected-by examining in great detail the extent of
any threat posed by that group to the United States government, con-
cluding that to believe there was any danger "is to believe the in-
credible."' 01 In considering the validity of a loyalty program for
teachers, he spelled out at length the "pall... cast over the classrooms"
by such measures." He pointed out the potential for suppression in
allowing the police to stop a public meeting at the first sign of hostility
to the speaker, 1 2 the significance of being able to hold a demonstration
at a symbolic site such as a prison,1 3 the impact of prolonged police
interrogation upon a fifteen-year-old youth,14 the realities behind
closing down all public swimming pools when blacks begin to seek
equality in public accommodations. 15 Moreover, his capacity for know-
ing what was going on extended beyond the area of civil liberties; it
included the problems of business, labor, consumers, the environment,
and many other matters.
9. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
10. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 589 (1951).
11. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 510 (1952).
12. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 331 (1951).
13. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49 (1966).
14. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-601 (1948).
15. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 235 (1971).
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This quality in Justice Douglas was most reassuring to lawyers on
the front lines, who sometimes wondered whether their sense of reality
had deserted them. Thus, when a majority of the Supreme Court up-
held the suspension from medical practice of a doctor who had relied
upon his First Amendment rights to refuse to answer certain questions
put by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, there was a
breath of fresh air in Justice Douglas's dissenting observation: "When
a doctor cannot save lives in America because he is opposed to Franco
in Spain, it is time to call a halt and look critically at the neurosis that
has possessed us."' 6 Similarly, it was comforting, when the majority
dismissed an effort by citizens to enjoin Army Intelligence from wide-
spread political surveillance, saying that the petitioners had suffered
only a "subjective 'chill,' "17 to have Justice Douglas respond that such
a claim to lack of standing "is too transparent for serious argument."' 8
Justice Douglas's approach to social facts, however, had a more far-
reaching impact. In effect, he was extending the concept of the Brandeis
Brief beyond economic issues to questions of individual rights. In this
respect his approach had an important liberating influence. It en-
couraged lawyers not only to state and apply evolving principles of law,
but also to seek to alter the Supreme Court's view of reality.
In essence, Justice Douglas was interested in using the law to get the
job done, a job he saw needed to be done. He was not interested in
mere abstractions, no matter how high the level. This passion for reality
has been the major basis for criticism that Justice Douglas was result-
oriented, unprincipled, and indeed anti-intellectual. It can also be
viewed as refreshing and creative jurisprudence.
A fourth characteristic of Justice Douglas, one that he shared with
Justice Black, was his understanding of, and empathy with, the dis-
advantaged. Despite his gruffness of manner at times, Justice Douglas
had remarkable rapport with common people. He could talk with them
and liked to do so. "[A]II men have a common humanity," he asserted;
"there is a oneness in the world which binds all men together."' 9
Justice Douglas was well aware of who the disadvantaged were; he
had lived among them as a youth and, when he reached the summit of
government, he continued to keep in touch with them and to educate
himself first-hand about their changing needs. They were the poor, the
uneducated, the racial and religious minorities, the unpopular political
groups, persons in institutions, Wobblies, sharecroppers. In essence,
16. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 474 (1954).
17. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) (opinion of the Court).
18. Id. at 24.
19. AN ALMANAC OF LmF.rn 3 (1954).
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they were the dispossessed, the people who were not represented in
public decisionmaking. As Justice Douglas knew, the fact that a legisla-
ture or an administrative agency had acted did not mean that the views
or interests of all people had been taken into account. America was not
a club.
Justice Douglas understood the plight of the dispossessed. He knew
what it meant when "public opinion casts a person into the outer
darkness." 20 And he endeavored to bring them into the mainstream of
American life, to help them share the benefits of the law, its ad-
vantages, its protections, and its remedies. "Freedom of speech, freedom
of the press, freedom of religion are available to all," he contended,
"not merely to those who can pay their own way." 21 And when the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures did not allow a mother on welfare
to refuse to permit a caseworker to visit her home without a warrant,
he insisted in dissent: "If the welfare recipient was not Barbara James
but a prominent, affluent cotton or wheat farmer receiving benefit
payments for not growing crops, would not the approach be dif-
ferent?" 2
2
Ultimately, Justice Douglas's sensitivity to the situation of the dis-
possessed grew out of his attitude toward nature. "[N]ature was a great
leveler," he wrote of his experiences climbing mountains; "[m]en fight-
ing a blizzard on the plains or an angry storm at sea at once became
equal.... The fact that a person lived on one side of the railroad tracks
rather than on the other made no difference." 23 Lawyers taking the
problems of the dispossessed to court were sure to receive a sympathetic
hearing from Justice Douglas.
A fifth theme that Justice Douglas constantly expounded was that
the achievement of liberty is a never-ending struggle. "All power is a
heady thing," he remarked.2 4 And there are always people in the society
who want to diminish the liberty of others. Hence, the life of a
responsible citizen can never be comfortable.
The main threat to liberty, of course, comes from governmental
power. Unlike some members of the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas
was not inclined to pay deference to the actions of government officials
or to presume that the government's power was always exercised for
the public good. On the contrary, he tended to view the government
20. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 454 (1956).
21. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943).
22. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 332 (1971).
23. OF MEN AND MOUNTAINS, sup~ra note 4, at 210-11.
24. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970).
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as potential malefactor, not to be trusted. Toward the end of his tenure
he declared, "The intrusion of government into this domain [freedom
of the press] is symptomatic of the disease of this society. As the years
pass the power of government becomes more and more pervasive. It is
a power to suffocate both people and causes. Those in power, whatever
their politics, want only to perpetuate it. ''2 5
Justice Douglas was likewise concerned with private power. Here,
also, he followed Justice Brandeis in feeling that "size can become a
menace. ' 2 10 Believing that "all power tends to develop into a govern-
ment in itself," he concluded that "Power that controls the economy
should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people, not in
the hands of an industrial oligarchy," and, hence, "Industrial power
should be decentralized."2
Under these circumstances, Justice Douglas felt, the ability of "We,
the People" to maintain our sovereignty over public and private power
could only be realized by a permanent militancy. It would take a lot
of energy. Life, as he was fond of saying, was "getting in and out of
trouble."
At the center of Justice Douglas's philosophy was a sixth theme. This
was that the judiciary should take a leading part in the affirmative
struggle to maintain and advance the American system. It was the
business of the courts to be guardians of what was special about
America, to "become the champions of the virtues that have given the
West great civilizations.1 2 Particularly was it the duty of the courts
to safeguard the Constitution, to keep it vigorous and undiluted.
In performing this function, Justice Douglas was always ready to
take on the major centers of power and influence in American society.
Thus, he concurred with the ruling against President Truman's seizure
of the steel mills,20 wanted to curb intrusions of the military into
civilian politics, 30 favored publication of the CIA budget,31 believed
the Court should look into the question of whether more than 100
members of Congress were violating the incompatibility clause of the
Constitution by holding reserve commissions in the armed forces,3 2 and
urged the Court to pass on the constitutionality of the Vietnam War.33
25. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 724-25 (1972).
26. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535 (1948).
27. Id. at 536.
28. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 11 (1958).
29. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633 (1952).
30. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 24-28 (1972).
31. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 197-202 (1974).
32. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 233-34 (1974).
33. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1316, 1321 (1973).
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Similarly, Justice Douglas's conception of the positive role of the
judiciary led him to reject the notion that judges could be "neutral,"
or could apply "neutral principles." In his view there was no such
thing as "neutrality" in the work the courts had to do; to be "neutral"
merely meant to preserve the status quo and ignore the problems that
needed solution. Hence, he had no use for "judges so wedded to the
status quo that critical analysis made them nervous."3 He told Eric
Severeid that he would rather create a precedent himself than find
one. And since lawyers also played a central role in the process, he
thought that they, too, should be bold and venturesome in maintain-
ing and developing the constitutional structure of American society.
Finally, it was Justice Douglas's deep conviction that the social order
in America could not stand still but must adapt to the changing times
and the new problems. Justice Douglas not only accepted social change,
but insisted on it. For him, America was an idea larger and better than
the prevailing system. He was ever ready to oppose those interests and
alter those institutions that fell short of American ideals. "If society is
to be responsive to human needs," he wrote, "a vast restructuring of
our laws is essential."
35
Justice Douglas's concern with transforming America carried to the
point where, like Jefferson and Lincoln, he did not shy away from
contemplating revolution. "Rebellion against government is a serious
matter," he warned, but "revolution can be a righteous cause ... [and]
the throwing off of chains by an oppressed people is a noble project."
36
In one dissenting opinion he wrote: "[S]ubmissiveness is not our heri-
tage. The First Amendment was designed to allow rebellion to remain
as our heritage."37 And about revolution, as about everything else, he
was upbeat: "That revolution-now that the people hold the residual
powers of government-need not be a repetition of 1776. It could be a
revolution in the nature of an explosive political regeneration."
38
Feeling as he did about social change, Justice Douglas was never
greatly impressed by mere institutional competence. "The issues that
challenge this generation call for bold and daring action,"
30 he de-
clared. "They demand men who live dangerously-men who place
adventure ahead of security, men who would trade the comfort of today
for the chance of scaling a new peak of progress tomorrow."
40 In this
34. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 454 (1969).
35. POINTS oF REBELLION 92 (1970).
36. AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY, supra note 19, at 3.
37. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28 (1972).
38. PoiNms oF REBELLION, supra note 35, at 97.
39. OF MEN AND MouNTAINs, suora note 4, at 328.
40. Id.
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respect, he thought of radically minded lawyers, not as part of the Left,
but as the very center of the American system.
Beneath Justice Douglas's call for social regeneration lay, as always,
his profound feeling for the greatness of America and his passionate
concern for its future. This was never better conveyed than at the close
of his preface to his autobiography, Go East, Young Man:
The overall aim of this volume and the volume to follow is the
hope that our people will come truly to love this nation. I hope
it may help them see in the perspective of the whole world the
great and glorious tradition of liberty and freedom enshrined in
our Constitution and Bill of Rights. I hope they will come to
love the continent, the most beautiful one in the whole world. I
hope that before it is too late they will develop a reverence for our
rich soils, pure waters, rolling grass country, high mountains, and
mysterious estuaries. I hope that they will put their arms around
this part of the wondrous planet, love it, care for it, and treat it as
they would a precious and delicate child.41
Such was the Justice before whom lawyers with causes came to plead
their cases. He lent an understanding ear, and his life and work should
inspire many to mold themselves in his image.
41. Go EAsT, YoUNG MAN xv (1974).
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